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INTRODUCTION
In

Takings and Distributive Justice,1 I proposed a progressive in

terpretation of the Compensation Clause.In his response, published in
this issue,2 Professor Lunney challenges the plausibility and the desir
ability of my interpretation and proposes an alternative. This Essay
compares our approaches. It concludes that Professor Lunney's care
ful examination of the public choice analysis of takings does refine my
theory. Contrary to Professor Lunney's claims, however, these refine
ments reinforce - rather than undermine - the viability of a progres
sive takings doctrine.
Parts I and II set the stage by summarizing the principal claims
made, respectively, in my original Article and in Professor Lunney's
response. Parts III and IV constitute the core of this Essay, vindicating
both the plausibility and the normative desirability of my proposed
doctrine. Part V provides two examples. A brief conclusion follows.

* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan; Senior Lecturer in Law and Juris
prudence, Tel-Aviv University. LL.B. 1988, Tel-Aviv; LL.M. 1991, J.S.D. 1993, Yale. - Ed.
My thanks go to Sharon Hannes, Rick Hills, Rick Pildes, and Omri Yadlin for helpful com
ments and suggestions, to Sarah Rathke for research assistance, and to the Cegla Institute
for Comparative and Public International Law for financial support.

1. Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999).

2. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Takings, Efficiency, and Distributive Justice: A Response to Pro
fessor Dagan, 99 MICH. L. REV. 401 (2000).
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A PROGRESSIVE TAKINGS LAW

In Takings and Distributive Justice, I claimed that takings law can
accommodate the ideals of social responsibility and equality, and ar
gued against the conventional wisdom that a relaxed regulatory tak
ings doctrine - one that seeks to minimize the occasions of compen
sating owners due to governmental regulation of their assets promotes these ideals. 3 By reconceptualizing two familiar tests in tak
ings jurisprudence - reciprocity of advantage and diminution of value
- I proposed a more refined test for distinguishing a taking from a
regulation with a view to both civic virtues and egalitarian concerns.
Finally, I suggested that, rather than radically transforming the current
law, my theory provides a doctrinal vocabulary and normative under
pinnings for understanding a significant segment of the already-extant
takings jurisprudence.
The premise of a progressive approach to takings law is that own
ership is not merely a bundle of rights, but also a social institution that
creates bonds of commitment and responsibility among owners and
others affected by the owners' properties. Furthermore, property is an
expression of a cluster of values - primarily privacy, security, and in
dependence - each of which necessarily entails the distribution as
well as the retention of wealth. Property necessarily entails distribu
tion since ownership is a source of economic and, therefore, social,
political, and cultural rights and powers, the correlatives of which are
other people's duties and liabilities. 4
Takings and Distributive Justice maintained that a progressive
takings doctrine, committed to social responsibility and egalitarian
concerns, must not - contrary to some conventional wisdom - be
too oblivious to the imposition of disproportionate burdens in the pur
suit of public actions. A relaxed takings doctrine, which calls for com
pensation only in extreme cases, would tend to yield a systematic ex
ploitation of small and relatively less well-off owners, who are ill
equipped to protect themselves.
Rejecting a relaxed takings doctrine of minimal compensation,
however, does not mean that progressives, being committed to social

3. For the conventional wisdom see, for example, C. Erwin Baker, Property and Its Re
lation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 764-65 (1986) (arguing
that protection against exploitation may not be best guide for property jurisprudence be
cause ban on unjust individual exploitation would necessarily be so broad that it would also
prevent desirable government actions); Frank.Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and
Restitution for the Lost Commons: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 69
(1997) (arguing that most regulatory restrictions of land use should be perceived as ordinary
examples of background risks and opportunities against which we take our chances as own
ers of property).
4. For a recent account of the progressive conception of ownership published after
Takings and Distributive Justice, see JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD:
LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF PROPERTY (2000).

136

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:134

responsibility and equality, must subscribe to a libertarian regime that
would require full compensation in every case. Libertarians would re
quire full compensation every time a taking's impact on one owner is
disproportionate to the burden carried by other beneficiaries of that
public use. 5 But progressives must reject a regime of full compensation
in every case because such a regime would bar any redistribution of
society's aggregate resources, wealth, and legal advantages.6 In addi
tion, progressives should be apprehensive about the libertarian strict
proportionality rule because it implies that our mutual obligations as
citizens are derived solely from either consent or self-advantage. Thus,
the strict proportionality regime underplays the significance of be
longing, membership, and citizenship, and it therefore undermines so
cial responsibility.
A takings doctrine attuned to the virtues of social responsibility
and equality must therefore avoid both of these extreme positions of
uniform no compensation and uniform full compensation. Instead, it
should start with a rule of long-term reciprocity of advantage: A public
action imposing a disproportionate burden is not a taking as long as
the immediate burden on the claimant is not extreme, and the claim
ant stands to enjoy benefits of similar magnitude from other public ac
tions, even if those benefits are not contemporaneous. This conception
of reciprocity of advantage attempts to recognize, preserve, and foster
the significance of membership and citizenship. At the same time, this
approach still cautiously avoids being too utopian about citizenship by
acknowledging the detrimental consequences that a no-compensation
regime would have in our non-ideal world and, thus, requiring long
term rough equivalence of burdens and advantages.7
A further refinement is necessary. An egalitarian takings doctrine
must be cautious lest it consistently require disproportionate contribu
tions to the community's well-being from owners who are either po
litically weak or economically disadvantaged. A government's claim
that a citizen should bear a disproportionate burden of a public action
based on the citizen's responsibility toward her fellow citizens is not

5. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 4, 205, 207 (1985).
6. Professor Lunney suggests that wealth distribution need not rely on takings doctrine,
but can instead be accomplished through progressive taxation. Lunney, supra note 2, at 424.
I have addressed this view in my original article in some detail, and have found it unpersua
sive. Dagan, supra note 1, at 785-92. For a recent critique of the view that distributive goals
are best accomplished through the tax code, see Chris W. Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal
Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000).
7. I also noted that localism can be an important component of long-term reciprocity of
advantage: "[The] conception of long-term reciprocity requires some distinction between
public actions that benefit localities and public actions of larger governmental bodies. In the
former category - where the beneficiary of the burden is one's local community - toler
ance toward deviations from proportionality is especially warranted." Dagan, supra note 1,
at 776.
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credible if it systematically targets the weaker sectors of society. This
concern is especially warranted when the direct beneficiaries of a gov
ernment action enjoy significant political or economic power. The
egalitarian prong of my proposed takings doctrine addresses these
concerns. Where the claimant is weak or disadvantaged, I propose to
replace the standard of rough reciprocity of advantage with the more
stringent standard of strict proportionality, which then better serves
the goals of a progressive takings doctrine.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the socioeconomic status of the
claimant should be considered overtly only in extreme cases. In most
cases, the egalitarian requirement of a progressive takings regime
should be satisfied using a proxy based on the diminution of value
test:8 If the diminution of value inflicted by the public action is meas
ured against the value of the claimant's affected land as a whole (or
her total holdings in the same locality), and the applicable threshold is
not set at the extreme positions of either total deprivation or de mini
mis reductions, this test yields a built-in disincentive against imposing
the public burden on small, politically weak landowners.9
Takings and Distributive Justice demonstrated (perhaps surpris
ingly) that considerations of efficiency also support a progressive tak
ings regime. 10 A progressive takings law is efficient, I maintained, since
8. My colleague, Professor Roderick Hills, disagrees. He claims that, as a matter of fact,
small landowners tend to be politically influential. In contrast, big landowners - developers
- in mid-sized American municipalities tend to be politically weak, because their "constitu
ents" are non-resident home-buyers who do not vote in municipal elections. Thus, Professor
Hills believes that existing takings doctrine gives too much, rather than too little, protection
to individual lot owners - overwhelmingly homeowners, whose politics tend to be NIMBY
(not in my back yard) politics. By the same token, current doctrine, in his view, does not give
enough protection to big developers who usually represent high-density housing, and there
fore low-income households.
If these claims are correct, then my proposed doctrine is seriously misguided, as it
strengthens the strong and weakens the weak, contrary to its own normative prescriptions.
In other words, under these empirical assumptions, the way to implement my call to use
takings law to counterbalance disproportional advantages of political influence is through a
very different doctrinal test, one that alters the law to protect developers more, because they
are the practical proxies for such home-buyers. Cf Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Home
owners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982) (landowners should have voting power
in municipal elections proportionate to their acreage, in order to allow developers to repre
sent their buyers by proxy more equally and effectively).
9. Indeed, Takings and Distributive Justice was consciously modest regarding the role
that substantive equality can play in takings doctrine. It openly acknowledged "the de
manding limitations that planning places on th.e possibility of promoting social justice
through Lludge-made) land use law." Dagan, supra note 1, at 779. Accordingly, it focused
merely on the attempt to avoid any preferential treatment of the better off. At times, Profes
sor Lunney's response ignores this subtlety. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 2, at 417, n.34 and
accompanying text.
10. I also maintained that considerations of personality support my progressive test and
that it does not unduly hinder the liberty concerns of the better-off. Dagan, supra note 1, at
790. Since Professor Lunney's response focuses on efficiency, I also ignore these other con
siderations. Professor Lunney also briefly refers to a concern of "horizontal equity." Lunney,
supra note 2, at 413. I have responded to this concern in some detail in my original article
and have found it unpersuasive. Dagan, supra note 1, at 788-89.
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it provides proper incentives to both private landowners and public of
ficials. Because Professor Lunney's critique does not address my ar
guments about private landowners,11 I will confine my discussion to
public officials.
Assuming that democratic mechanisms make public officials ac
countable for budget management, compensation is important to cre
ate a budgetary effect that forces governments to internalize the costs
that their decisions impose on private resource holders. Without a
compensation requirement, public officials might suffer from a "fiscal
illusion" as to the true social cost of government action. The need to
overcome public officials' "fiscal illusion" applies especially when the
injured parties are part of the nonorganized public - where they are
"occasional individuals," or where they are members of a marginal
group with little political influence. In these cases, in which the risk
that public officials will dismiss private costs is acute, compensation
may be the only feasible counterbalance. In contrast, in cases in which
the public action imposes costs on members of powerful and organized
groups, the landowners will probably be able to protect themselves
politically, even in the absence of required compensation. Even if a
powerful landowner suffers a loss due to the public use, the political
system offsets this loss (in many cases) by a quid pro quo elsewhere,
either with regard to planning issues or in other matters.
Thus, a uniform nonprogressive compensation regime distorts the
incentives of public officials by systematically encouraging them to
impose the burden on members of the nonorganized public or on mar
ginal groups, even where the best choice, from a planning perspective,
would place the burden on members of powerful or organized groups.
Only a progressive compensation scheme equalizes the pressures that
the public authority faces when selecting the land that will bear a pub
lic project, and only a progressive compensation scheme induces the
public authority to focus solely on planning considerations.
11. For private landowners, progressive compensation appropriately mediates between
two conflicting investment considerations. Compensation is said to be required to prevent
underinvestment by risk-averse landowners in their property. However, if the law guaran
tees the full value of landowners' investments whenever they could have foreseen the pros
pect of a loss in value as the result of a public use, landowners may inefficiently overinvest.
Due to the diminishing marginal utility of income, the concern of inefficient underinvest
ment by landowners is heightened (and compensation consequently gains in importance) to
the extent that the taking affects a more substantial segment of the injured party's estate (all
other things being equal). A progressive compensation regime approximates a proper bal
ance since it offsets this increased risk of underinvestment by increasing compensation.
Thus, a private homeowner, who is not a professional investor and who has purchased a
small parcel of land with her life savings, may be a typical example where full compensation
should be required. In contrast, wealthier individuals - and even more so, broadly-held
corporations - who own land as part of diversified investment portfolios - are less risk
averse. Facing a possibility of an uncompensated investment, they are likely to efficiently
adjust their investment decisions commensurate with the risk that their land will be put to
public use. For extremely wealthy landowners, the concern of under-investment may not
mandate full (or even any) compensation.
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PROFESSOR LUNNEY'S CRITICISMS

Professor Lunney's response discusses only the egalitarian prong
of my theory, but he does not address how the diminution of value test
(as a proxy for egalitarian concerns) implements this component.
Rather, Professor Lunney criticizes my idea of "compensat[ing] more
readily or at a higher level the less wealthy property owners." 12His cri
tique is twofold. First, he claims that "inject[ing] an express distribu
tive justice component into the compensation analysis . . . will not
work," 13 namely, that such a scheme will not effectively neutralize the
lobbying pressure of politically powerful contingents. Second, he
maintains that even if my scheme does work, "achieving a balance in
such a way would prove undesirable. " 14
Professor Lunney discounts the notion that a progressive takings
law would generate an effective counterbalance to the lobbying pres
sure of powerful groups as "implausible." 15 He analyzes two types of
cases and anticipates results opposite to those predicted by my the
ory . 16 First, Professor Lunney discusses cases in which "the govern
ment must choose between acting, and thereby imposing a cost on a
powerful interest group, and not acting at all." 17 Regarding these "act
or abstain" planning decisions, Professor Lunney is not persuaded by
my claim that "we need not compensate politically powerful interest
groups as readily because their political power will enable them to ex
tract compensation through the give-and-take of the legislative proc
ess." 18 The political power to block a specific measure, he maintains,
may not be convertible to political power elsewhere. Professor Lunney
reminds us that political power "is usually contextual and therefore
inherently dependent on the position one is taking." 19 Therefore, a
"principled opposition" to a proposed government action on the mer
its is more effective than "attempted extortion" of compensation.20 If
successful, principled opposition would reveal that the proposed ac
tion was "undesirable," and would therefore leave no room for any

12. Lunney, supra note 2, at 406.
_

13. Id. at 402.
14. Id. at 407.
15. Id. at 409.

16. For methodological reasons, I start my discussion with "act or abstain" planning de
cisions and only afterwards turn my attention to placement planning decisions. Professor
Lunney discusses these cases in the opposite order. Nothing but the flow of my argument
turns on this reordering.
17. Lunney, supra note 2, at 417-18.
18. Id. at 418.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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further "log-rolling bargain." 21 Only "[a]n up-front promise of com
pensation . . . can substantially overcome this public choice prob
lem. " 22
Professor Lunney reaches a similar conclusion regarding cases in
which there is a choice between imposing the burden on a relatively
powerful and a relatively powerless property-owning group. His claim
regarding these cases of placement planning decisions is twofold. As
the relative compensation to powerful contingents decreases, he
claims, their opposition to the costs of public planning decisions im
posed on them "would likely grow stronger and even more strident. "23
By the same token, "as you pay more to the [powerless] landowners,
their opposition . . .would be reduced. "24 Given these consequences,
public planning burdens are more likely to be borne by the less power
ful, regardless of efficient planning considerations, thereby increasing
the likelihood that the planning authority's decision will be regressive
and inefficient.Professor Lunney also maintains that we cannot count
on "[t]axpayers and other groups competing for government fund
ing" 25 to oppose the higher cost of planning decisions since "[t]hese
budget-concerned groups are . . . only indirectly affected by the higher
[project] cost that progressive compensation may generate" and are
thus unlikely to be an effective counterbalance. 26 At best, trying to
force effectively unbiased placing decisions through progressive com
pensation would result in governmental inaction. The regressive (and
inefficient) placement will no longer be affordable; the progressive
(and efficient) one "would not be politically viable." 27
Even if my progressive takings doctrine works as I expect, how
ever, Professor Lunney still would not endorse it for three main rea
sons. First, the "simpler and more appropriate avenue" of increasing
compensation to approximate the landowners' true losses should
"tend to quiet" political opposition to placement decisions and
thereby achieve my goal. 28 Thus, uniform full compensation encour
ages planning authorities "to adopt the efficient, rather than the politi
cally-expedient, solution." 29 Funding compensation through progres
sive taxation is how Professor Lunney would further the proper
distributive goals. Second, a progressive compensation scheme would
21. Id. at 419.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 409.
24. Id. at 410-11.
25. Id. at 410.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 411.
28. Id. at 412.
29. Id.
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require courts either to second-guess what constitutes socially optimal
planning decisions or to separate legitimate from illegitimate uses of
political power on the part of affluent powerful groups and "award
progressive compensation in those cases in which it appeared that the
illegitimate political power was driving" the project placement deci
sion.30 These determinations - as well as the concept of distributive
justice itself - are "the least susceptible to judicial resolution." 3 1Thus,
Professor Lunney invokes

"Lochner's shadow" to warn against the in

stitutional difficulties my theory raises. Finally, while Professor
Lunney does not dispute the value of social responsibility and civic vir
tue, he insists that "these, like all virtues, come from within and cannot
be forced by legal rules." 3 2 A progressive takings regime may force
property owners "to give up their property ...for the sake of the com
munity," but it can never make them "more virtuous or more respon
sible." 3 3
Professor Lunney also presents an alternative to progressive tak
ings.34 His interpretation of the Compensation Clause focuses on
"whether the government has acted in a manner to deprive the very
few of a property interest for the sake of the very many." 3 5 Requiring
compensation in such instances would "eliminate the few's opposition
to the measure and thereby improve the legislature's ability both to
evaluate the proposed action's merits and to go forward should action
prove desirable." 3 6 Thus, "a uniform few-many test, together with
something closer to 'true loss' compensation awards, would achieve
the same distributive justice goals if funded through progressive taxa
tion" and it "would prove better able to overcome the efficiency con
cerns associated with takings." 3 7
Ill. THE INCENTIVES OF PROGRESSIVE COMPENSATION
A.

Public Choice and Public Reason

The crux of Professor Lunney's complaint about my progressive
takings doctrine lies in his analysis of the incentive effects of our com
peting regimes on the behavior of public officials. If I read him cor30. Id. at 414.
31. Id. at 416.
32. Id. at 425.
33. Id.
34. Professor Lunney has presented this alternative earlier: Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A
Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1892 (1992). I have
criticized his scheme in Dagan, supra note 1, at 753-54.
35. Lunney, supra note 2, at 420.
36. Id. at 402.
37. Id. at 424.
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reedy, Professor Lunney has no normative quarrel with social respon
sibility and equality (although he believes that social responsibility
cannot be promoted by law). Moreover, we both agree that a proper
regime should neutralize, as much as possible, any biased (non
planning) considerations from the planning authority's decision. We
differ, however, as to which regime would do the job.
In discussing this question, I want to use Professor Lunney's help
ful refinement of traditional public choice analysis. Most such analyses
(including mine, in my original article) conceptualize interest groups'
influence only in terms of their wealth, power, and comparative ad
vantage in acting collectively (the "collective action comparative ad
vantage"). Professor Lunney resists this reductionist strategy. He in
sists that political power is contextual and, more importantly,
dependent upon one's position and one's arguments - that the plau
sibility, and even persuasiveness, of an interest group's lobbying ef
forts must be taken into account in considering its ultimate influence.3 8
Professor Lunney's refinement on this front seems to me persua
sive. Injecting normativity into the public choice analysis is important
and valuable. It (implicitly) helps mediate between two accounts of
government action. 3 9 One account understands the government to act
as a buffer between conflicting interests and to aggregate their respec
tive pressures. Another, much more sanguine, account sees the gov
ernment as a loyal servant of the public interest. Each of these ac
counts has been the subject of some criticism. The former account public choice theory - is said to undervalue the constraints that pub
lic reason imposes on legislative (or administrative) action; thus, it is
accused for being positively inaccurate and normatively nihilist. 4 0 The
latter account - public interest theory - is criticized for disregarding
the influence of parochial interest groups; thus, it is portrayed as ro
mantic, naive, and frequently - given our non-ideal world in which
such influence is prevalent - counterproductive. 4 1As I understand it,
Professor Lunney's framework transcends this divide. It acknowledges
the reality of influences based on wealth, power, and collective action

38. Traditional public choice analysis may present this point as the need to consider the
relative abilities of interest groups to mobilize votes. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE
STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 114 (2000). While this point is indeed familiar, I think that the
way Professor Lunney recasts it is valuable. As the text below explains, Professor Lunney's
formulation focuses the inquiry on the normative power of an interest group's reasons. Thus,
the reformulation (implicitly) highlights the importance of the prevalent social meanings
that ultimately determine this normative power.
39. On these two accounts of government action, see, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED,
CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PuBLIC LAW 15-21, 32-40
(1997); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process,
98 COLUM. L. REV. l, 34-41, 65-70, 76-81 (1998).
40. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 39, at 25-27; Croley, supra note 39, at 41-56.
41. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 39, at 27-29; Croley, supra note 39, at 70-76, 81-86.
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comparative advantage. It still insists, however, that reasons have their
own weight. 4 2 Thus, both public choice and public interest are ac
knowledged.
I happily endorse this account, which ignores neither material in
centives nor social meanings. I believe, however, that my takings the
ory, building on incentives and social meanings, is improved rather
than challenged by using this richer understanding of government.
B.

"Act or Abstain" Planning Decisions

I believe that the specific conclusion Professor Lunney draws from
this framework to the takings context is misguided. Professor Lunney
believes that, given the importance of reasons, an interest group's ef
forts to resist an undesirable public measure must be understood in
the binary terms of success (blocking the measure) or failure. There
fore, in his view, there is (almost) no possibility of translating that
group's political influence into any type of compensation because the
group's justifications for blocking the measure are inapplicable to any
other context. Thus, only a legal entitlement to full compensation can
help neutralize the potentially distorting pressure of strong interest
groups.
This conclusion is premised on the view that once an objection to a
project is formulated as a commodified claim for a quid pro quo, it
loses all value. This view, however, is implausible for two reasons.
First, in order for Professor Lunney's conclusion to be correct, the
persuasiveness of an interest group's reasons should solely determine
its influence. But if there is any truth in the public choice insight of the
impact of power, wealth, and collective action comparative advantage,
this must be wrong. Even if a shift from an effort to block a measure
to an attempt to extract compensation elsewhere detracts from the
persuasive power of lobbyists' claims, their material influence does not
simply evaporate. Second, even if we focus solely on the normative
power of the interest group's opposition, it is not clear that such a shift
would indeed have the devastating consequences Professor Lunney
anticipates. He portrays the choice between blocking an action and
requiring compensation as a choice between a (benign) "principled
opposition" on the merits and an "attempted extortion" (necessarily
invidious) of a quid pro quo.43 But this characterization assumes what
must be proven. While I appreciate the a priori advantage of an argu
ment that presents a project as socially undesirable, this is by no
means the only type of argument with normative power. In particular,
an argument based on distributive distortion - a complaint of majori-

42. Cf Don Herzog, Externalities and Other Parasites, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 895 (2000)
(reasons underlie preferences).
43. Lunney, supra note 2, at 418.
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tarian exploitation - can be just as principled as one targeting the de
sirability of the proposed government action. Therefore, there is no
reason to believe that such an argument would not gain, if perceived
to be correct, at least as much sympathy and normative power. 4 4
Because a complaint against the distribution of a project's costs
can be just as normatively powerful as a complaint against the proj
ect's social desirability, and because the non-normative bases of the
power of interest groups are, in any event, also significant, it is reason
able to conclude - contrary to Professor Lunney's objection - that
power asserted (albeit unsuccessfully) to block a public measure can
be translated into power to extract in-kind compensation if the pro
posed project does go forward. 4 5 Hence, Professor Lunney is wrong in
claiming that only a legal entitlement to compensation can overcome
interest group objections where the government's choice is imposing
the cost on such a group or not acting at all. 4 6
C.

Placement Planning Decisions

Consider now the other type of case, in which the planning
authority faces a choice of placement respecting a given public action.
Professor Lunney believes that a progressive takings law tends to pro
duce either regressive placement decisions or government inaction.
But again his analysis is flawed.
Professor Lunney's first argument on this point is that, as the rela
tive compensation to powerful contingents decreases, "their opposi
tion . . . would likely grow stronger and even more strident."4 7 He
seems to be aware that - compared to the current state of the law my theory would not decrease the absolute level of compensation

44. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, BO HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1216-17 (1967) (the key
to demoralization - a pivotal concern in the utilitarian analysis of just compensation law lies in the "risk of majoritarian exploitation").
45. Cf Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 376 n.89 (2000) ("Lunney fails to recognize
that insofar as compensation is a useful way for legislatures to co-opt concentrated interest
groups opposed to takings, they will pay compensation voluntarily.").
46. The main example Professor Lunney uses for the "act or abstain" planning decision
scenario is Penn Central v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). I discussed Penn Central at
some length in my original article. Dagan, supra note l, at 795-99. Following this discussion,
Professor Lunney admits that Penn Central shows that progressive compensation does not
invariably lead to a defeat of desirable projects. But he still resists progressive compensation
because, in his view, progressive compensation generates heightened opposition costs of
powerful claimants that are socially undesirable even when their lobbying efforts are ulti
mately unsuccessful. However, the claim that progressive compensation generates excessive
opposition costs - a claim central to Professor Lunney's discussion of the placement plan
ning decision cases, to which I now turn - is untenable. See infra text accompanying notes
47-49.
47. Lunney, supra note 2, at 409.
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granted to affluent landowners, but rather (indirectly, via the proxy of
diminution of value) increase the average level of compensation to
powerless landowners. Nonetheless, he maintains that
progressive compensation would still generate more strenuous opposi

tion by the [affluent] contingent ... [as they] would still have more to
complain about because they would not be receiving as much as the
[weaker] landowners would have. The perception of unfairness gener

ated by the unequal compensation levels would lead the [affluent] con
tingent to demand "equal" (and hence fair) compensation.48

This statement seems to follow our shared premise regarding the im
pact of the justificatory power of reasons on an interest group's power.
It assumes that a progressive takings law is unfair and thus concludes
that the influence of an affluent contingency opposing a measure un
der such a regime would be stronger than its influence under current
rules.
Professor Lunney's assumption, however, begs the question. I cer
tainly agree that, other things being equal, opposition to a patently un
fair measure is frequently more powerful than opposition to a fair
measure. But a progressive takings regime is not patently unfair. On
the contrary, this regime vindicates - better than Professor Lunney's
uniform few-many test (as Part IV shows) - the values of social re
sponsibility and equality. Hence, insofar as social responsibility and
equality are - or will become - respectable public reasons under a
progressive compensation regime, there is no reason to believe that a
legal regime that relies on these values would be especially vulnerable
to interest group fairness challenges.
Professor Lunney's second argument in support of the claim that a
progressive takings law would generate regressive placement decisions
is that such a regime would reduce the opposition of weaker landown
ers to placement decisions that hurt them. It may be true that the
prospect of greater compensation would somewhat increase compla
cency among such groups, but this impact is likely to be rather mini
mal. As Professor Lunney himself admits, compensation under current
law is far from being complete. 4 9 (It notably does not cover subjective
losses. 5 0) Thus, even when "just compensation" is granted, a claimant

48. Id. at 409 n.20.
49. Id. at 406. Nevertheless, Professor Lunney "defines" just compensation as that level
of compensation that makes landowners indifferent. Id. at 412 n.26.
50. Good economic reasons exist for the law's choice not to cover subjective (nonpecu
niary) losses. Recall that compensation is a kind of insurance, for which all citizens pay (by a
tax increase). Conventional economic wisdom says that people are generally not interested
in purchasing insurance for nonpecuniary losses because the extra money they will get can
not, by definition, restore the irreplaceable good that they lost. Thus, taxpayers do not value
the compensation for the nonpecuniary fraction of their losses in cases of takings more than
the money lost in the tax increase. (Notice, however, that although potential takings victims
do not want insurance-compensation ex ante, they will still - as the text below claims want increased compensation ex post in order to minimize their nonpecuniary losses.) See,
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can hardly be expected to remain indifferent between compensation
and the loss inflicted by the public action at issue. Professor Lunney is
aware of this difficulty and therefore advocates "something closer to
'true loss' compensation awards."5 1 This response, however, is inade
quate. The problem is not only with certain doctrinal faults that can be
easily reformed. Rather, undercompensation is inherent in the takings
scenario: "Both transaction costs and subjective preferences may lead
landowners to prefer the status quo - which .includes the possibility of
voluntary realization - to the forced transfer of their proprietary
rights against the fair market value thereof,"5 2 however calculated.
Therefore, no technical reform of the just compensation formula is
likely to satisfy disgruntled landowners sufficiently that they lose in
terest in lobbying to shift the impact of a public project to other peo
ple's land.
Finally, Professor Lunney maintains that if we tried to force the
proper placement of the public project through progressive compensa
tion, the likely result would be governmental inaction because budget
ary constraints would make placement on the land of weaker owners
impossible, while political concerns would preclude building the proj
ect on the land of the more powerful landowners.5 3 This conclusion is
untenable: First, as I indicated above, progressive compensation would
not make powerful landowners' resistance to disadvantageous siting
decisions much more zealous and vociferous. Furthermore, Professor
Lunney's conclusion discounts (or ignores) the fact that invariably, in
such situations, some additional pressure will come from the commu
nity that needs the project at hand.5 4 The community will also be able
to marshal normatively powerful arguments in favor of the planning
decision. Finally, because the compensation accorded to the less afflu
ent is never higher than the diminution of the fair market value of
their land, there is no basis for Professor Lunney's claim that progres-

e.g., STEVEN SHAYELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 228-31 (1987); Patricia M.
Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 517, 521 (1984). But see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs
of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1914-16
(1995) (advocating nonpecuniary damages on basis of consumer demand).
51. Lunney, supra note 2, at 424.
52. Dagan, supra note 1, at 755.
53. Lunney, supra note 2, at 418-19.
54. This argument depends on the assumption that the community that needs the proj
ect can organize to support it. The extent or intensity of this additional pressure will obvi
ously vary, depending in part on the ability of the benefited group to organize to support the
project. Despite potential collective action problems, however, it would not be unreasonable
to assume that this additional pressure would be considerable if the proposed project were
indeed socially beneficial.
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sive compensation will make project sitings on the land of the less af
fluent prohibitively expensive.ss
*

*

*

In contrast to Professor Lunney's arguments, progressive compen
sation would not increase the effective opposition of strong interest
groups, and it would not significantly decrease the opposition of
weaker landowners. It will work - as intended - as a legal pressure
that increases the cost of placing a project in a way that harms the
powerless. Contrary to Professor Lunney's claim, the higher price tag
on taking less affluent properties does not "introduce an artificial
bias" that may distort unbiased siting decisions.5 6 Rather, this mecha
nism works to counterbalance an already-extant bias in the system the heightened political power of affluent groups - so that planning
considerations can once again become the focus of the siting decision.
It is, admittedly, difficult to figure out how much legal pressure is
required neatly and exactly to neutralize the non-planning lobbying
pressures of such strong interest groups. Nonetheless, it is important
to realize that the absence of countervailing legal pressure does not
generate the "efficient, rather than the politically expedient, solution,"
as Professor Lunney implies.5 7 Rather, any nonprogressive regime, in
cluding Professor Lunney's proposed few-many· rule, generates place
ment decisions that are biased in favor of strong landowners and are
55. The main example Professor Lunney uses to show the inferiority of my progressive
compensation proposal in the placement planning decisions scenario is the Watts Freeway
Project. He claims that the unfortunate placement of the freeway resulted from the fact that
Just Compensation law does not fully compensate, so the more affluent landowners' opposi
tion simply drowned out the poorer landowners' objections due to their heightened political,
economic, and social power. Lunney, supra note 2, at 404-06. However, the Watts Freeway
case may actually illustrate that a uniform full compensation rule will invariably push the
burdens of planning decisions on the less well-off simply because the price tag will always be
lower. Pursuant to the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Poli
cies Act §§ 4601 et seq., whenever a government project displaces a property owner, the head
of the displacing agency must reimburse the displaced owner for the actual and reasonable
moving expenses and loss of personal property. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4622. In cases of residen
tial displacement, the government must also pay the reasonable cost of replacement dwelling
in cases where reimbursement alone is insufficient to cover this expense, any debt service
costs required to finance replacement housing, and any reasonable expenses incurred for
evidence of title, recording fees, and any other costs incident to the replacement housing
purchase. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4623(a). Subject to the inherent, unresolvable difficulties of any
compensation scheme, discussed supra note 52 and accompanying text, this formula very
nearly approximates "full compensation." And, following precisely the predictions of my
theory, at least one of the reasons cited by the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment
Agency for their decision to run the highway through Watts and Compton rather than
nearer to downtown in the Beverly Hills area was that relocation in the former area was es
timated to cost only $50,000 per unit, while relocation in the more expensive areas was esti
mated to cost almost twice that. See William Trombley & Ray Hebert, Bold Housing Pro
gram Develops Big Problems, L. A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1987, at 1.
56. Lunney, supra note 2, at 415.
57. Id. at 412.
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thus systematically both regressive and (from a purely planning view
point) sub-optimal. Only a progressive compensation scheme im
proves on - although imprecisely and probably still imperfectly58 these undesirable outcomes.59
IV. THE SOCIAL MEANING OF PROGRESSIVE COMPENSATION
In the conclusion of his response, Professor Lunney raises doubts
as to the propriety of my attempt to promote social responsibility and
civic virtue through law. Desirable they are, he admits, but he still
claims that "these, like all virtues, come from within and cannot be
forced by legal rules." 60 A progressive takings law may generate desir
able material results, "[b]ut we should not make the mistake of think
ing that we have thereby made [the affected] landowners more virtu
ous or more responsible. We have simply set the stage for them to
make absolutely certain that someone else will have the pleasure of
experiencing 'civic virtue' the next time." 6 1
This response fails to appreciate the expressive role of rights - in
our context, the right to property - in constitutional adjudication. It
further undervalues the intricate ways in which legal discourse affects
social meanings. Finally, it paradoxically undermines the importance
of Professor Lunney's own insight regarding the interaction between
power and reasons in the way interest groups influence outcomes.
In characterizing the expressive role of rights, Professor Pildes re
cently explained that "[r]ights are not general trumps against appeals
to the common good," 6 2 as they are sometimes mistakenly conceptu
alized. Rather, in actual constitutional practice, rights "serve as tech
nical means for bringing into court these issues involving the constitu
tional conception of various common goods." 6 3 Properly understood,

58. Indeed, in some cases, as Professor Lunney claims, increased relative compensation
to less well-off property owners may push the cost of imposing the planning decision on the
less well-off higher than the cost of imposing it on the wealthy, even when choosing the land
of the less well-off owners is more efficient. Id. at 414 n.29. But there is no reason to believe
that this effect will be particularly frequent. And there is certainly no reason to think that
this imperfection outweighs the regressive distortions of a uniform compensation scheme.
59. At one point, Professor Lunney almost concedes my claim that less compensation
would ensure unbiased placement decisions. He admits that a reduced compensation scheme
may be needed to compensate for disproportionately vocal lobbying groups. Id. at 412 n.27
(relating to "the road contractors' pro-road influence"). This concession admits that in
creased compensation to less affluent and powerful groups is appropriate to counterbalance
the non-planning-related pressures that the affluent are able to bring to bear on planning
decisions.
60. Id. at 425.
61. Id.
62 Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms,
and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 729 (1998).
63. Id. at 744.
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rights discourse is a means to "constrain the kind of reasons that gov
ernment can act on when it seeks to regulate or intervene in some
sphere of activity." 6 4 Rights discourse enables courts "to attend to the
expressive dimensions of governmental action," policing its corre
spondence to "collective interests and structural concerns." 6 5
Takings and Distributive Justice fits within this expressive frame
work. 6 6 This interpretation suggests that the Compensation Clause is
devoted to realizing not only the common good of individual liberty
but also other common goods: social responsibility and equality. In
corporating this multitude of common goods into the meaning of the
constitutional right to property redefines the scope of legitimate gov
ernment intervention. I have already addressed in the previous Part
the direct material consequences of this doctrine, but it is significant to
appreciate its expressive dimension as well. A progressive takings law
is a symbolic public expression of our bonds of concern and solidarity
with others, a political reaffirmation of the importance that we attach
to social responsibility and civic virtue. 6 7
Moreover, this expressive dimension is likely to generate cultural
consequences that may feed back into the direct material conse
quences of the doctrine. The social meaning of the right to property the common goods we believe this right is meant to realize - defines
the realm of normatively powerful objections to government action, as
well as the realm of objections that we tend to perceive as merely self
centered, and thus publicly inconsequential. More precisely, as I claim
in the remainder of this Part, incorporating a progressive conception
of property into takings law is likely to affect the normative power of
the claims raised by the parties in a way that reinforces the outcomes
intended by the progressive takings doctrine.
It is important not to overstate the claim of the normative influ
ence of takings law: I do not believe that the doctrinal details of tak
ings law, or of any other branch of the law, for that matter, directly
shape people's values and preferences - obviously not the prefer
ences and values of those it immediately regulates. The possible cul
tural consequences of takings law are more subtle in at least two
senses.
First, "what may affect people's preferences and values are not
specific doctrinal rules (of which they are usually unaware), but rather,
the more fundamental legal concepts and institutions. Thus, in our

64. Id. at 731 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 761, 744.
66. For an elaborate exposition and defense of this expressive framework, see Elizabeth
S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).
67. Cf ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL MEDIATIONS 288-92
(1989).

150

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:134

case, I do not claim that the specific contours of the compensation re
gime of takings law have any expressive function." 6 8 Rather, I claim
that, given its prominence and popular visibility, "takings doctrine
may have significant ramifications on our conception of ownership,
and that ownership - a concept of popular use that is legally con
structed - may affect people's preferences and values." 6 9 In other
words, my proposed theory expresses a progressive approach to own
ership that internalizes civic virtues and egalitarian concerns about dis
tribution into the concept of property. And it is by vindicating this
progressive understanding of ownership that a progressive takings law
may help reshape our vision of our responsibilities as owners, our ex
pectations of owners, and the limits of what we perceive to be the le
gitimate interests of owners. 7 0
Second, even the more fundamental legal concepts and institutions
- in our case, ownership - do not directly affect the preferences and
values of the people they regulate. Rather, because people's decisions
are "based in part on their perception of the values, beliefs, and be
havior of other individuals," doctrines that affect the social meaning of
fundamental legal concepts and institutions - such as the rules that
determine our understanding of ownership - exert social influences
that eventually affect the regulated subjects. 7 1
Even considering these two caveats, critics - such as Professor
Lunney - may be alarmed by any reference to the value-shaping
function of law. The concern is typically twofold. First, one should not
"assume too readily that the government will exercise this [function]
in a benign fashion." 7 2Second, legal intervention "may weaken, rather
than foster, an individual's capacity for moral choice" by converting
moral action to one induced by "the individual's selfish desire to avoid
law's sanction." 7 3

68. Dagan, supra note 1, at 791 n.177.
69. Id.
70. For the crucial importance of re-negotiating the meaning of the concept of property
given its "normative resilience," see Jeremy Waldron, The Normative Resilience of Property,
in PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 170, 190-91, 195 (Janet McLean ed., 1999). See also,
e.g., Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Private Property and Public Propriety, in PROPERTY
AND THE CONSTITUTION 11, 15 (Janet McLean ed., 1999) ("[F]airly huge outcomes will turn
on whether we attribute continued vitality to the unqualified exclusory function of 'property'
or choose instead to fashion our property thinking to accord with more inclusive, more inte
grative visions of social relationship.").
71. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349, 365 (1997); see also Hanoch Dagan, In Defense of the Good Samaritan, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 1152, 1172 (1999); Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Set/
Governance in Residential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal The
ory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1065 (1998).
72. Lunney, supra note 2, at 424.
73. Id. at 425.
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A cautious attitude toward governmental action is always war
ranted.7 4 But notice that the caution about law's stance towards fun
damental moral choices does not apply merely with respect to legal
regimes that attempt to promote other-regarding values. Rather, it
applies, and with identical force, with regard to libertarian legal re
gimes. As an important social institution, law cannot avoid affecting in the modest sense described above - popular consciousness.7 5
Therefore, the question is not whether law should be in the business of
affecting values, but rather which values law should promote.7 6
To be sure, there are cases in which law's coerciveness indeed un
dermines its normativity. Where the goals or the means of a legal
norm are overly ambitious vis-a-vis people's preexisting preferences,
they are perceived as unreasonable, maybe even offensive.77 In such
cases, law is devoid of any normative impact. Its recipients, like
Holmes' bad man, respond solely to its sanctions.78
But the progressive takings doctrine I propose does not fall into
this trap. It is consciously modest respecting the disproportionality of
the burden imposed in the name of social responsibility. Moreover, it
justifies the denial of compensation only if such burden is likely to be
offset by benefits of similar magnitude.Finally, the material impact of
my proposed doctrine would be to increase the level of compensation
granted to powerless landowners without decreasing the compensation
afforded to affluent landowners. Thus, progressive takings law, as I
understand it, does not eliminate people's capacity to make moral
choices voluntarily. Consequently, it does not reduce the moral worth
of human action.7 9
Having these refinements in mind, it is significant that Professor
Lunney's developed understanding of interest group influence help-

74. See supra text accompanying note 5.
75. See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Per
spective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FuRTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
167, 218-19 (1983); Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of
Legal Scholarship and Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 27-32, 51-54 (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993).
76. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, TuE NATIJRE OFTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS 171 (1921):
Every time uudges] interpret contract, property, vested rights, due process of law, liberty,
they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of social philosophy; and as such interpreta
tion is fundamental, they give direction to all law-making. The decisions of the courts on
economic and social questions depend upon their economic and social philosophy . . . .
77. Dagan, supra note 71, at 1172-73; Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves:
Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000).
78. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
167, 171 (1920). But cf Guido Calabresi, Two Functions of Formalism, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
478, 485, 488 (2000) (discussing the Italian approach to the role of law as a propounder and
protector of ideals and implying that, as such, it is bound to fail in practice).
79. I have discussed the relationship of law and altruism in more detail elsewhere.
Dagan, supra note 71, at 1169-73.
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fully highlights the importance of the social meaning of a progressive
takings law. Insofar as takings law affects, to some extent, the meaning
of ownership, it affects the normative power of various claims of own
ers and thus their actual influence. The persuasiveness of owners'
complaints - on the importance of which Professor Lunney rightly
insists - is thus, to an extent, endogenous to takings law and cannot
be regarded, as Professor Lunney regards it, as an external, pre
existing datum that guides takings law. Therefore, by reshaping the
meaning of ownership to include concerns for distribution and civic
virtues, a progressive takings law reshapes our understanding of what
constitutes the appropriate distribution of a public action's costs. This
result, in turn, affects the normative power of interest groups' opposi
tion in a way that reinforces the material progressive outcomes I an
ticipated in my original article. 8 0
V.

Two EXAMPLES

Before I conclude this Essay, I wish to turn to two examples. These
examples help illustrate the practical differences between Professor
Lunney's position and mine. They also demonstrate that - in contrast
to Professor Lunney's insinuation 8 1 - my progressive takings theory,
initially developed in the context of governmental interferences with
land ownership, can easily be extended to other resources as well.
These examples 8 2 further vindicate the predictability of a principled
progressive takings law, contrary to Professor Lunney's opposite innu
endo, 8 3 and in sharp contrast to the contemporary chaotic state of
takings doctrine. 8 4 Finally, these examples show that Professor
Lunney's admonitions regarding the insurmountable (Lochner-like)
difficulties of judicial competence my theory generates are highly ex
aggerated.
Both examples involve cases in which the government settles a
claim in a way that affects the rights of individual citizens. In the first
example, the government's settlement with another sovereign limits a
citizen's claim against that sovereign. While the Supreme Court in

80. Jeremy Bentham has already insisted on law's limited, but significant, ability to
"manipulate expectations" regarding property. Jeremy Waldron, Supply Without Burthen
Revisited, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1479-80 (1997).
81. Lunney, supra note 2, at 417 n.34. The examples Professor Lunney uses are also
taken exclusively from the context of landownership.
82. As well as the three examples I used in Takings and Distributive Justice, supra note
1, at 792-801.
83. Lunney, supra note 2, at 422.
84. See, e.g., Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Princi
ples, Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1301-04
(1989).
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Dames & Moore v. Regan85 left open as unripe the question of whether
such a settlement constituted a taking, 8 6 Justice Powell noted in con
currence that, "[t]he Government must pay just compensation when it
furthers the Nation's foreign policy goals by using as 'bargaining chips'
claims lawfully held by a [sic] relatively few persons and subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts." 87 Lower courts have followed Justice
Powell's theory that compensatory claims with which a government
has interfered are "property interests" for takings purposes, and have
accordingly scrutinized the constitutionality of such governmental in
terferences. 8 8
The leading case in this context is Shanghai Power v. United
States. 8 9 An American corporation sought compensation for its lost
claim against China resulting from China's confiscation of the com
pany's power plant in Shanghai. The President extinguished all out
standing claims against China in the process of establishing diplomatic

relations, and the company's portion of the settlement, about $20 mil
lion, was far less than the company's claim of $144 million. 9 0 Judge
Kozinski concluded that there was no compensable taking. First, al
though the company did bear a disproportionate loss in the short term,
there was no radical disproportionality; the company did recover some
amount of its losses. Second, the court noted that the President's abil
ity to establish good relations with foreign nations was what made for
eign trade and travel for Americans and American corporations possi
ble. 9 1 In the long-term, the company stood to benefit as a long-term
trader, and thus no compensation was necessary notwithstanding the
short-term disproportionate loss.
This case vividly demonstrates the applicability of my progressive
theory in a nonland context. The considerations raised by Judge
Kozinski for denying compensation nicely mirror my proposed inter
pretation of the reciprocity of advantage test: Long-term reciprocity
suffices to deny compensation, even where the immediate burden sus
tained by the claimant is clearly disproportionate. Moreover, because
the company was a strong business entity able to fend for itself in ne
gotiating with the government, this case does not present any egali
tarian concerns that would have justified a stricter proportionality
analysis.

85. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
86. See id. at 688-89.
87. Id. at 691.
88. See, e.g., In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th
Cir. 1982); Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
89. 4 Cl. Ct. 237 (1983).
90. Id. at 239.
91. Id. at 244-46.
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Furthermore, Shanghai Power is a classic example of a case in
which Professor Lunney's "few-many test" would require compensa
tion: Few claimants suffered substantial losses in the name of a public
action benefiting the public as a whole. This type of case should have
presented a conspicuous example for Professor Lunney's claim that
compensation is needed in order to prevent concentrated interest
groups from skewing the authorities' social calculus and blocking de
sirable public actions. As we see, however, this warning is un
grounded; the claimants did not block the settlement. 9 2To be sure, as
an effective interest group, these traders may well have succeeded in
extracting some in-kind compensation from the pertinent governmen
tal agency. But this, of course, only vindicates the redundancy of a le
gal entitlement to compensation, rather than its necessity.
Shanghai Power is a case in which Professor Lunney's few-many
test requires compensation, whereas my progressive takings doctrine
justifies Judge Kozinski's no-compensation ruling. My second example
involves an inverse case, in which, according to my theory, compensa
tion should be awarded, whereas Professor Lunney's approach would
probably result in the denial of any compensation claim.
Consider the recent settlement between the tobacco industry and
the States. In another article, Professor White and I demonstrate that
this settlement is closely analogous to the Dames & Moore pattern of
government settlements and extinguished claims. 9 3 More precisely, we
show that the tobacco settlement may generate statutory limitations
on the tobacco industry's future tort liability to private litigants. 9 4 We
also show that, even absent such direct curtailment of citizens' claims,
there may be some indirect evidence - the States' receipt of industry
payments in excess of their preventive and ameliorative costs and their
spending of such funds on causes that have nothing to do with the in
jured citizens' interests - that the tobacco settlement may sacrifice
the interests of injured citizens. 95

92. Professor Lunney's discussion of Penn Central may imply this response to my analy
sis of Shanghai Power. Even if the beneficial public action was not blocked, progressive
compensation may still have generated heightened opposition costs that are socially undesir
able. However, as I explain above, the claim that progressive compensation generates exces
sive opposition costs is unconvincing. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
93. Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (2000).
94. This would reintroduce the McCain Bill that would have explicitly capped injured
smokers' compensatory claims and barred punitive damages awards and class actions. Id. at
369-70.
95. Id. at 371-72. To clarify: the case would have been different if the funds were held in
trust for use by injured citizens.
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Can injured smokers invoke the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend
ments if these concerns tum out to be true? 9 6 Do such governmental
interferences with citizens' compensatory claims justify compensa
tion? 9 7 Professor Lunney's test seems to suggest a negative answer,
since the potential claimants - the injured smokers - are many and
dispersed. 9 8 They are of the "occasional individual" type, part of the
nonorganized public. They have no specific political influence that
poses a threat to beneficial public actions involving a curtailment of
their interests. Hence, compensation is not required to buy their coop
eration.
Professor White and I, however, give the exact opposite answer to
this question. In our view, governmental interference with the legal
claims of injured citizens in the name of the public good cannot be
deemed just unless it is accompanied by compensation.
To see why, consider again the doctrine I advanced in Takings and
Distributive Justice.99 It is not sufficient, under the progressive ap
proach to takings, to show disproportionality between the benefits ac
cruing to the injured smokers through the tobacco settlement and the
harm they suffer insofar as the settlement interferes with their com
pensatory claims against the industry. The key lies again in the re
quirement of long-term reciprocity. This requirement insists that
probable, and not merely theoretical, reciprocity take place. The mere
fact of the owner's membership in the benefited community cannot be
of enough advantage to offset a tangible disproportionate loss. Long
term reciprocity further safeguards against too extreme a transient
imbalance by disallowing overly excessive private burdens. In the case
of the tobacco settlement, this requirement patently fails to obtain. It
is hard to see what future probable benefits could offset the very sig
nificant harm (diminution of value) of injured smokers once the gov
ernment interferes with their compensatory claims against the tobacco
industry.Absent a Shanghai Power-like finding of long-term reciproc
ity, compensation should be - according to my proposed doctrine required.

96. Class actions advancing such claims have been recently filed. See Stephen Labaton,
Medicaid Smokers Seek to Gain Share of States ' Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, January 26, 2000, at
11.
97. Governmental interferences with citizens' punitive damages awards present complex
questions that cannot be addressed here. See Dagan & White, supra note 93, at 416-24.
98. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit Line in Tak
ings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 433, 440-41 (1995) ("courts should focus on
whether government has: (i) changed or restricted property rights that are (ii) of significant
value only to a very few to benefit the very many. . . . If such singling out has not occurred,
then a court should allow the government to impose the rights change without compensating
the adversely affected property holders" (emphasis added)); see also id. at 497-98 (same).
99. Other approaches to takings also reach similar conclusions. Dagan & White, supra
note 93, at 415.
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The egalitarian concerns of my progressive takings doctrine further
bolster this conclusion. In order to see why, we do not need to second
guess the socially optimal decision or to separate legitimate from ille
gitimate political power, as Professor Lunney's Lochner-ism line of
critique maintains. Rather, it is enough for us to evaluate the political
power of the claimants, an evaluation which is surprisingly similar to
the questions Professor Lunney's theory asks us to address.
Whereas the inquiry my theory requires is analogous to the inquiry
needed under Professor Lunney's theory, our conclusions are strik
ingly contradictory. In my view, the fact that the (many and dispersed)
injured smokers are devoid of any political clout supports - rather
than undermines - the urgency of compensation. Without a strong
constitutional guarantee, the interests of injured citizens may easily be
disregarded, and public officials may use their compensatory damages
for more politically-visible purposes. Neither distributive justice nor
efficiency is promoted by inducing these perverse incentives.
CONCLUSION
Professor Lunney helpfully advances the public choice analysis of
takings law by insisting that the social persuasiveness of interest
groups' claims, and not only their wealth, power, and collective action
comparative advantage, determines their impact on public decisions.
This insight highlights the significance of the social meaning of the
constitutional right to property, which is, in turn, affected by the way
society shapes takings law. Hence, this refined public choice analysis
requires us to interject the evaluation of these cultural consequences
of takings law into the more directly material consequences of our
doctrinal alternatives.
Taking these implications seriously bolsters, rather than frustrates,
the progressive approach to takings. Professor Lunney's response em
phasizes the significance of my proposal to graft social responsibility
and equality onto takings law. It also reinforces, rather than under
mines, my argument that takings doctrine must supply an effective
counterbalance to the "natural" power disparity in society in order to
ensure unbiased governmental decisions.

